“THE past isn’t dead; it isn’t even past.” These words, which United States President Barack Obama likes to quote, are from a story by William Faulkner, our Nobel novelist. They’ve never seemed as appropriate for the situation in Iraq as this past week.
Of course, in the immediate sense, we have a simple case of Sunnis getting even with Shias. Saddam Hussein kept the artificial state of Iraq together by gassing Shias on behalf of the minority Sunni. So, Iraqi Prime Minister Prime Minister Nouri al-Maliki, a Shia, now ignores the Sunni or beats them down whenever the opportunity arises.
Former US president George W. Bush, of all people, and from the not particularly peaceful state of Texas, let him come to power on the condition that he integrate the Sunni population into the military, the civil service, and, in general, give them a stake in a united Iraqi state.
Of course, he proceeded to do the exact opposite. Who should be surprised that Sunni areas like Mosul would ally with terrorist groups like ISIL, the Islamic State in Iraq and the Levant, rejected even by al-Qaeda for being too violent, to defend themselves against Shia military, given a green light by al-Maliki? Of course, ISIL went a little over the top, in seizing Mosul, Iraq’s second-biggest city, and establishing a base to spread across northern Iraq and eastern Syria.
Al-Maliki’s troops simply abandoned their bases and their weaponry, refusing the suicide that al-Maliki’s policies had led to. The reputed half-a-million civilians who fled the city represents one of the largest two-day refugee flows in history. That’s history made by the feet.
But all of America’s policies and that seized upon by al-Maliki was based on a false premise. There never has been an Iraq, at least one that has the requisite qualities of a nation-state that can defend itself.
Curiously, there has been a successful Kurdish state within Iraq, that issues its own postage stamps and runs itself efficiently. Since 1991, the Kurds were protected by the no-fly zone we imposed at the end of the 1991 war. If any group in the Middle East deserves statehood, it’s the Kurds. There is a significant minority in Turkey but the Turks, especially the present government, won’t even allow for a discussion of a Kurdish state that would obviously destabilise eastern Anatolia.
As for the rest of Iraq, it emerged out of the collapse of the Ottoman Empire after World War 1, with the British and French, not to mention the oil companies, competing for influence in the region. Hashemite princes ascended the thrones of both Jordan (where they still rule) and the new Iraqi kingdom, but that didn’t last too long and the Iraqi Hashemite king was dragged through the streets. As Saddam Hussein once said, to paraphrase, it’s a rough part of the world and nice guys don’t last long.
One of the great ironies of the American occupation is that it occurred during a time of unremitting hostility towards Iran. But by fostering “democracy”, we virtually handed over much of Iraq to Iran, the only independent Shia state. The obvious option for Western policy now is to work as closely as possible with Iran, which, at least, is a viable state, while the Iraqi tribes fight it out.
It doesn’t look as if there is anything the US can do to counter the swift takeover of much of northern Iraq by radical militants.
There are writers in the West who believe that all is not lost; al-Maliki, who was technically elected (by the majority Shia population), could radically shift course, make a new deal with moderate Sunnis and play them off the terrorist organisations. Sometimes, one just has to admit that it’s too late. Obama seems inclined to permit some drone strikes against the most obvious ISIL bases. But ISIL now controls so much territory that it can simply shift to better protected areas and consolidate their hold on what they hope will become a syariah-based caliphate, spanning eastern Syria and Iraq’s huge Anbar province.
With the momentum that ISIL has gained, it’s a question of whether Baghdad can be spared. I wonder if the best policy isn’t to abandon al-Maliki to his fate, reinforce Kurdistan and watch a new map of the Middle East emerge. The Saudis and Gulf states will then have to face radical Sunni Islamists and Iran backed Shia. This is not a hypothetical danger; the working population of the Gulf States is mostly Shia, and northeast Saudi, where the oil is, has a large Shia minority.
Rather than reinforcing weakness, it seems obvious that we should beef up our Persian Gulf bases, continue to work with Iran towards a nuclear deal and a good working relationship, and then jointly fight terrorists groups, like ISIL, which are a common enemy. It’s the least bad policy choice. Perhaps Obama suspected it would come to all this, leading to his pivot to Asia.
All we can do is defend our long-time friends in the region and, once again, after 34 years, base our policies in the region on the overlapping interests that Iran and the West share. At least this would be based on realities and not pipe dreams. And then hope that, like everywhere else, large populations that obviously don’t wish to be ruled by thinly-based terrorists, will rise up to defend schools for girls, the rule of law and a future connected to a very connected, more civilised, world.