THE Islamist extremist group al-Shabab returned to international headlines with a horrific attack on April 2 at the Garissa University College in northeastern Kenya. Authorities believe that at least 148 people were killed and at least 79 people were injured. The militant group’s dramatic return is now thought to have been the worst terror attack in Kenya in almost two decades, worse than the Westgate Mall attack that left 67 people dead on Sept 21, 2013.
Kenya responded by bombing positions of the militant group in neighbouring Somalia and reported that two camps had been destroyed. This latest attack is part of the ongoing operations involving the African Union Mission in Somalia (Amison) that started in 2011.
The Somalia-based al-Shabab has pledged a “long, gruesome war” against Kenya, the birthplace of President Barack Obama’s father and home to many of his relatives. The group said its attacks were in retaliation for acts by Kenya’s security forces that are part of the Amison.
Since the Westgate attack, the militant group has been eclipsed by the likes of other more high-impact jihadi groups such as the Islamic State (IS) and Boko Haram, two movements that seemed to represent a new generation of terrorism. Similar to the IS, Nigeria’s militant Islamist group Boko Haram is fighting to overthrow the government and create an Islamic state.
Many analysts think al-Shabab has deeper origins in the Salafist militia Al-Ittihad Al-Islami, which emerged in the 1990s after the fall of Somalia’s military dictatorship. Al-Shabab means “the Youth” in Arabic, though the group refers to itself as Harakat al-Shabaab al-Mujahideen (HSM). It was once a part of the Islamic Courts Union (ICU), a coalition of Sharia courts that had gained control of much of the country in 2006.
In Somalia, it is clear that al-Shabab does not have the power it once had. After ICU was defeated by troops loyal to the Somalia transitional government and Ethiopia in 2007, al-Shabab fighters retreated to the countryside, to turn to guerilla attacks and suicide bombings. The group had some success, even occupying parts of the Somali capital of Mogadishu between 2007 and 2011.
While many fighters in the group appear to be motivated by nationalist and local concerns, many of the group’s senior members have links to al-Qaeda and may have fought in Afghanistan.
The group’s leader, Mukhtar Abu Zubeyr, is said to have been the mastermind of the Kenyan mall attack. The Kenyan mall attack brought renewed international attention to al-Shabab. Less than a month later, the US mounted a raid on an al-Shabab compound in Barawe, Somalia.
Compared with IS and other militant groups that have grabbed the headlines recently, Zubeyr and al-Shabab may seem an obscure enemy. But the group is clearly seen as a threat by the US. In September last year, while the world was discussing US strikes on the IS in Iraq and debating the merits of action within Syria, American officials were apparently planning military action in Barawe. The target was Zubeyr. It is unknown whether he survived the attack.
To this day, Kenya has faced multiple attacks by al-Shabab militants who want the country’s military to leave Somalia. In November last year, at least 28 non-Muslims travelling to Nairobi were executed after the militants ambushed the bus they were in.
Just days before the Garissa attack, al-Shabab militants stormed a hotel in Mogadishu frequented by foreigners and government officials. At least 24 people died in that attack, including six militants.
Al-Shabab’s attacks in Kenya seem to have a dual purpose, seeking to persuade Kenyan politicians to withdraw troops from Somalia but also fomenting religious divides within Kenya. In the Garissa attack, Muslims had been separated from Christians and allowed to flee.
Kenya’s Muslim community, which accounts for about 11 per cent of the population and live mainly in the northeastern and coastal parts of the country, has long claimed political, social and economic discrimination by successive Kenyan governments.
Kenya’s Muslims faced various human rights abuses by security agencies, particularly the Anti-Terrorism Police Unit (ATPU), including extortion, harassment and arbitrary detention. The ATPU was also reportedly involved in the extra-judicial killings of suspected al-Shabab operatives and sympathisers. More than two decades ago, in government efforts to deal with banditry and clan conflicts, some 1,000 people were shot dead or burnt alive by security officials.
As a result of decades of marginalisation, northeastern Kenya as well as parts of the coastal region lack basic services such as paved roads, schools and hospitals. These regions suffer from poverty, high youth unemployment, rapid population growth and general insecurity. Consequently, resentment towards the government is high and radicals are able to exploit these factors. Chronic youth unemployment, for example, makes al-Shabab’s promise of some income attractive.
The return of al-Shabab, like many other radical movements is linked to sectarian rift. To win the war against al-Shabab, Kenya will have to reform its approaches to improve its relations with its ethnic Somali community and Muslim population by making the community part and parcel of mainstream Kenya. Preventing another Garissa massacre would need a little more effort than just warplanes.
The writer is a former lecturer of UiTM, Shah Alam and International Islamic University Malaysia (UIA), Gombak