TENSIONS are rising in the Korean Peninsula as North Korea’s nuclear test is followed by a missile launch and threats to mobilise its nuclear forces for immediate action, while other interested states take harder lines, culminating in the toughest sanctions so far imposed by the United Nations Security Council (UNSC).
The regular annual military exercises between South Korea and the United States (this year larger in size than any over the past five years) coincide with key anniversary dates in the North Korean political calendar, which justify heightened rhetoric from the North. The situation is going to get worse before it gets better.
The young leader, Kim Jong-un, this year gave himself a special present by authorising his state’s fourth nuclear test just two days before his birthday in January. He would have anticipated an adverse reaction from the international community and some form of resolution to be passed by UNSC, but he probably also calculated that, given the extensive sanctions already in place, there might be relatively little extra that could be added.
Moreover, he expected that China, though clearly disquieted by the test (which it was not informed about in advance), would, in the end, hesitate to tighten sanctions — particularly the flow of fuel and food — to an extent that would bring the North to its knees and potentially cause a collapse that could bring thousands of refugees flooding into China. He would also have hoped that Russia, with whom he has tried to develop at least a marriage of convenience over the past two years, precisely as relations with China soured, might also take a softer line.
In taking such steps, Kim may have been more focused on domestic concerns than external reactions. He has announced a major party meeting, the Korean Workers Party Congress, in May, the first one in 36 years, to enshrine his policy priorities.
The nuclear and missile tests are a means of reinforcing his credibility and image among his people before the congress. In contrast to the nuclear test conducted by him in 2013, this one was covered in the North Korean media unusually, by showing the signed orders from Kim himself. The North Korean claims that a hydrogen bomb type of device was exploded have been largely discounted by Western experts, and yet, this bravura shows not only that Kim is his own man, but that he is also steadily adding to the nuclear legacy of his father and grandfather.
In the prolonged process of Sino-American negotiation over the terms of the latest UNSC resolution, the missile launch early last month — an example of Kim “getting his retaliation in early”, to use an old rugby phrase — became the tipping point. Angry at the defiance, China signed up for UN sanctions that are more comprehensive than previous ones, not least because, if properly implemented, they now cover North Korean commercial trade, including the inspection of all ships. Initial signs are that China is being more vigorous in its sanctioning, but in the medium term, it wants stability in the peninsula, despite the North being an awkward ally. Expect a gradual loosening of restrictions, a greater emphasis on diplomacy and renewed calls for a peace treaty mechanism.
China has consistently, but fruitlessly called for a return to the Six-Party Talks, the multilateral forum, comprising China, Japan, North Korea, Russia, South Korea and the US, that it initiated in 2003 to discuss the denuclearisation of North Korea, but which collapsed in acrimony in 2009. Since then, the North has intermittently engaged in bilateral talks with involved states, not least as a means of breaking up any united front against it, but has been unable to secure the benefits it hopes for in terms of recognition, security and aid. The current mood among the international community is that the ball is now in China’s court to try influencing North Korea by thoroughly implementing the new sanctions, but ultimately, any satisfactory resolution of the crisis has to be settled between the US and North Korea. In the end, diplomacy will have to be tried.
Malaysia, as a member of UNSC, joined the unanimous vote on the latest resolution. But, given its close links to both Koreas and, of course, to the US and China, Malaysia can usefully contribute to resolving or, at least, defusing the tension. Just as Malaysia had played a constructive role behind the scenes in helping draw Iran back into the international community through its own nuclear agreement, so, too, with North Korea — which, over the past few years, has become more interested in developing links with Southeast Asia — there could be a role for an “honest broker” from outside the key six parties.
Brian Bridges is adjunct professor at
Lingnan University, Hong Kong (based in Malacca)