On Sept 21, 1963, the London-based weekly The Economist heralded the birth of “…the brave new state, born on Monday”. The periodical had anticipated that “the most serious threat to Malaysia will, of course, come from within — from internal jealousies, racial suspicions and mistrust, and from political and economic tension”. If there is any consolation, the writer of “Malaysia: Brave New State” concluded that all federations were a gamble and Malaysia was no exception.
The article further argued that “Singapore would otherwise have succumbed to communism, and that the Borneo territories could not have survived independently and separately, still seems valid to east Asia”. The Economist was largely favourable in their coverage of events leading to independent Malaya and towards the formation of Malaysia.
It has been said that the journalist is a contemporary historian. On Aug 31, 1957, an article in the periodical began as such: “Malaya’s sovereignty is thus a milestone both on its own road and so that of Asia. But what of the road ahead?” Describing the new nation-state as a new beginning “as well as an end”, what follows would affect the much wider circle of “the free nations of Asia. And of the circle outside Asia that hopes they will remain free”.
These representations of Malaya and Malaysia, were, however, made within the framework of superiority and power — the (colonial) dominance over other peoples and cultures, and indeed, a patronising attitude.
We cannot avoid noticing misinterpretations and stereotyping, and, perhaps, some doubts over the Malaya/Malaysia project resonating Whitehall’s position on the colony. One was on Tunku Abdul Rahman’s approach: “…but if the Tunku is genuinely liberal in his approach, and shows resolutions in fighting communism, he is likely to gain on balance”.
In “A Constitution for Malaya” (Feb 23, 1957), The Economist, arguing on issues of nationality and provisions to safeguard “Malayan jobs and rights in the land” had likened the “last-minute rush to Malayan independence” to “rival the Gold Coast photo-finish”.
To the British official mind, Malaya was a project for decolonisation that, if “rightly guided”, the progress toward self government would be achieved. “Local autonomy” was urgently significant for the colonial office in light of events in neighbouring Indochina, where France was fighting a losing battle.
In its long-term objective of securing a reliable ally, the colonial mind was weary of the Tunku. In “Citizens of Tomorrow”, it reported that an unofficial delegation of Chinese associations had raised the issue of citizenship to Lennox-Boyd. They had asked that the qualification for citizenship to be widened to include “many Chinese now disqualified, and recognition of Chinese and Tamil as official languages”.
Although the Tunku assured Lennox-Boyd, the Colonial Secretary, and a complex figure who served during the decisive period of British decolonisation (1954-59), there is no evidence, according to the periodical that the Tunku “allowed himself to be swayed”.
The relationship between the colonialist and the colonised resonated in The Economist’s discourse of comparing Malaya’s problems to that of British experiences in Africa. A July 6, 1957 article described Malaya’s communalism as complicating “constitution-making as much as Africa’s tribalism”.
The article, titled “Islamic State” (and this phrase is from more than 59 years ago) stated on the right to use “Chinese or Indian languages for official purposes for the first ten years of the life of the new state disappears”. And that there is to be no review on Malay land rights, and appointments and nomination of Malays for public posts and senators.
And in “Asian Milestones” (Aug, 31 1957), The Economist evokes a tinge of nostalgia, phrasing it as “one of history’s huge wheels completes today a revolution that began centuries ago”. The birth of the sovereign federation of Malaya ends European rule on the Asian mainland. And that age began when the venturers, who had acquired trading posts, “factories” and strongholds on Asia’s coasts and offshore islands, were led on to take control of the great tracts of territory
With Penang island in mind, Europeans (and the British), “long content with the mystery of the sea, embroiled in continental affairs only when these threatened their commercial interest, they assumed — sometimes eagerly, sometimes with reluctance — the new role of administrators and rulers”.
The Economist admitted that “Malayan independence brings the wheel full circle”. On Aug 31, it editorialised that “Britain is nevertheless handling over in Kuala Lumpur today. Nor is the ruling power yielding now to a belated upsurge of nationalist violence or accepting the de facto destruction of its authority”.
If in September 1963, The Economist asserted that Malaysia was a gamble, in an earlier issue in February the same year, the periodical described the Malaysian idea as admirable. Among other reasons, it pointed out that “(in) British eyes — the plan had the virtue of preserving the Singapore base while allowing Whitehall to ease itself out of its colonial remnant in Borneo”. Against the backdrop of constitutional arrangements for the two Borneo territories of Sarawak and North Borneo (as Sabah was known then), the story ends with this note: “…whatever reservations the peoples of British Borneo may have about the Malayan connection, it is clear that they have no taste for Indonesian rule”.
Datuk Dr A Murad Merican is professor at the Centre for Policy Research and International Studies (CenPRIS), Universiti Sains Malaysia