A new chapter in the classical “Great Game”, with all the 21st century dimensions and complexities, has begun. Nowhere near any resolution, one of the longest conflicts in history is set to extend into an uncertain future.
Tough on Pakistan, benign on Afghanistan, but not ready to help in its nation-building and contemplating a greater role for India, United States President Donald Trump on Aug 22 unveiled his country’s South Asia policy.
It marks a determined bid to return to the centre-stage of Afghanistan that straddles South, West and Central Asia. The implications are huge.
An estimated 3,900 troops will add to 8,000 soldiering on in Afghanistan. More would follow since no timeline has been indicated.
More than 100,000 Americans had failed to contain the Taliban who now control over 40 per cent of Afghan territory.
Military hardware will need to be deployed to the landlocked country, inevitably, through Pakistan. The iffy relationship with Iran after Trump’s threat to renege on the nuclear deal negates that alternate corridor. Central Asia was never a viable route.
But Trump has called Pakistan all possible names that diplomacy and security discourse permit. Pakistan is livid at the threats that, although justified from America’s standpoint, are humiliating. Its media alleges that the US is “scapegoating” Pakistan to hide its own failure in Afghanistan.
The proverbial salt on the Pakistani wounds is inviting India to play a larger role in Afghanistan. Asking Pakistan to contribute to the values that India represents — civilisation, order and peace — has irked Islamabad no end.
Its allegations about India trying to “destabilise” Pakistan through its “30 consulates” (actually four), and for asking India to resolve the Kashmir dispute have been ignored.
Pakistan’s Army chief has sought America’s “trust and respect”. Judging from what Trump, his chief diplomat Rex Tillerson and many American lawmakers say, both are running pretty low.
America’s “do more” calls are raising Pakistan’s heckles. The US withheld US$900 million (RM3.8 billion) in last two years. Even if more funds are withheld, Pakistan will do little of that “more” to distance itself from Afghan Taliban it has sheltered and target the Haqqani network that trouble the American forces.
These are its basic security priorities, Islamabad insists. Like it had done with presidents George Bush and Barrack Obama, it would rather sit out the Trump endeavour till the mercurial president changes his mind, again, or till a new administration revives the “back-home” promise.
American lawmakers may not seriously take Pakistani assurances (and actions on ground) on combating terrorism. But, successive administrations do seriously view Islamabad’s threats of running to China. Now, Trump’s policy decidedly pushes Pakistan into China’s willing embrace.
Trump wants to return to Afghanistan to retrieve the space that Obama’s victory-less withdrawal conceded to China. Not in the “Great Game” earlier, China, in tandem with Pakistan, is now a formidable player.
With the army chief’s rhetorical rejection of American money, Pakistani analysts have begun to call it “peanuts” — the same word Ziaul Haque had used to reject president Ronald Reagan’s dole in the 1980s. Zia knew he was indispensable to the Western plans to oust the Russians from Afghanistan.
Two decades later, Pervez Musharraf was browbeaten by Bush’s threat to “bomb Pakistan back to stone age” into joining the “global war against terrorism”. But, not anymore with China as the savior.
China is committed to charting its own emergence across South Asia and more importantly — retain its role in Afghanistan. Pakistan knows this well, whether or not the Americans do.
Hence, the nuclear angle is added for good measure. Pakistan’s veteran editor Najam Sethi writes of the US risking “losing nuclear-armed Pakistan”.
He also warns: “A tense stalemate would not benefit the Americans but it would provoke angry Pakistanis into terrorist reprisals globally.” Mark the last three words.
Trump’s speech gave no inkling if Nato will join in the way it did after 9/11. His ties with that military alliance have also been testy. For the Europeans, the “global war against terrorism” they once joined has crossed into their cities.
It’s a changed Europe after Britain’s Brexit, hosting willingly or otherwise, thousands of refugees from West Asia and battling like much of the world, the Islamic State and its branches and affiliates.
Finally, the India part, since this is being written from New Delhi. Trump’s policy is a booster since it counters the Sino-Pak moves to overawe Afghanistan and force a Taliban-influenced, if not Taliban-led government in Kabul.
It is a gain, but entails serious caution. Hard-headed policy planners and analysts would not get blinded by an unpredictable Trump’s current attitude towards Pakistan.
India can and will invest more in building Afghan infrastructure. Being singled out for this by Trump is a bit perplexing when he only wants to “fight the terrorists” in Afghanistan. But anything beyond, like a military combat role, would have to be a no-no.
Delhi can push the Iran route to Afghanistan via the Chabahar port, but for the US’ iffy ties with Teheran.
Scope lies in diplomacy. India can work with the US up to a point and help neutralise the Sino-Pak combine, but not block it.
It enjoys goodwill among the Afghan people, but has constraints, including absence of a common border, to make any strategic difference. Like other players, it would have to sail with the wind.
The writer is NST’s New Delhi correspondent. He is president of the Commonwealth Journalists Association and a consultant with Power Politics monthly magazine.