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India uncomfortable with US-China conflict

IT is most perplexing if the leader of the world’s mightiest power showers encomiums on a country’s prime minister, and supposedly takes cues from him on how to set things right in the latter’s region, yet, imposes debilitating restrictions to punish a third country.

This is happening to India. United States President Donald Trump calls Narendra Modi “a friend”, but will not allow him to buy Iranian oil and defence hardware from Russia because he does not like those two countries and wants to impose sanctions on anyone who deals with them.

Ironies, some sweet, some sour, are inescapable as India engages with the world.

We have the word of Bob Woodward (of the Watergate Scandal fame) that on July 19 last year, Trump praised Modi — not to him while playing host or to Indian American acolytes — but while talking to top honchos of his administration in the Situation Room in White House.

Trump has called Fear, Woodward’s latest book on him and his administration, “reckless” and “fictional”.

But there is nothing to contradict the author’s account of the meeting with Modi.

Trump’s fondness for the Indian premier is known. He has praised him and India many times before, even before becoming the president. He is a rare president with investments in India.

As per that account, Modi whispered to Trump asking why the US was seeking to quit Afghanistan when it had “got nothing”. And Trump said, indeed, “Nothing. Afghanistan has massive mineral wealth. We don’t take it like others — like China”.

Imagine someone advising Trump, a successful businessman, that the US would be “losing” something in Afghanistan.

And imagine that coming from Modi, a humble tea-seller to boot.

But then, stating this as an aside, anyone born or raised in his home state Gujarat grows up with a business sense. Modi supposedly complained to Trump about Pakistan’s role in fomenting terrorism in the region. Now, from an Indian standpoint, nudging the US to stay on in Afghanistan and complaining about Pakistan is perfectly credible.

But what followed, according to analysts, is even more interesting.

Trump was then reviewing the Afghanistan-Pakistan policy. After praising Modi to his officials three weeks after the two had met, he said: “I’m not making a deal on anything until we get minerals.”

And six months later, on this New Year Day, Trump opened a broadside against Islamabad calling its leaders “liars”, who had not cooperated on fighting terrorist groups in Afghanistan.

Whether Modi’s supposed exhortation actually prompted Trump to dig in Afghanistan, reversing his own electoral campaign commitment, or his punishing Pakistan at Modi’s instance and cancelling the US$300 million (RM1.24 billion) payment, shall remain in the realm of speculation.

But it is likely to boost Modi’s image as a global leader among his supporters in time for the 2019 elections.

Amidst all this positivity comes a bunch of ironies. They underscore the fact that diplomacy is not all hug-and-praise — not if it involves a mercurial Trump, not when Indo-US relations are involved and certainly not, if India, from American standpoint, is to be pitted to “contain” China.

After much dithering and postponing once, India’s External Affairs and Defence Ministers met their American counterparts this month for the first time in what was ambitiously called 2+2.

Among India’s tangible gains is access to American military hitech and knowledge technology that were hitherto unavailable under the American laws.

This consolidates the “major defence partnership” amidst the lows recorded here some weeks back. Among them are restrictions on visas that facilitate students and workers and trade issues.

Surely, India has joined the list of countries increasingly frustrated with US trade policy, despite closer than ever strategic ties and despite being a key market for US businesses. India now feels caught in the crosshairs of the US-China trade war.

For long years India withstood US pressures against dealing with Iran. Washington used to be firmly told that they were part of the “historical” ties. But things changed with the turn of the century during the George Bush Jr era, when India began to vote against Iran and reduced its oil imports.

Indications are that it will end these imports totally before Nov 4 when American sanctions on Iran commence. This impairs strategic autonomy that New Delhi has jealously guarded. It is becoming clearer that if India’s own perceptions differ from those of the US with regard to Iran, Russia or any other country, they will create their own tensions, but New Delhi will have limited control.

India’s domestic discourse, overwhelmed by unprecedented rise in fuel prices (petrol crossed INR 90 and diesel 85 per litre this week), is completely detached from end to Iranian fuel imports.

The voices that decried the 2003 Anglo-American attack on Saddam’s Iraq are silent today.

India was asked, but refused to send troops to Iraq then. Today, some quarters approvingly speculate on sending troops to Afghanistan. The government has so far refused. Times are a changing. Similarly, any talk of the intended purchase of Russian S-400 Triumf missile defence system is overwhelmed by a raging controversy over Modi’s government purchase of Rafale, the French-built combat aircraft.

Analysts see the India-US strategic convergence as balancing China’s rise, especially in the Indo-Pacific region. But China is India’s immediate neighbour with sensitive border disputes. Weaker capabilities compared to both China and the US limit India’s role.

India’s dilemma on managing the India-US-China triangular dynamics shall persist. India is definitely uncomfortable being sucked into any US-China confrontation.

Expecting a “democratic India” to counter a “communist” China is an outdated story. India needs to mark its Asian presence first.

Modi (or any other Indian prime minister) understands this well and counts among “friends” Vladimir Putin, Shinzo Abe and why, even Xi Jinping. So would Trump (or any other US President).

Geopolitics in a multipolar world can be dicey. Every nation guards its own interests. Doing that today is more complex and daunting, but essential.

Mahendra Ved is president of the Commonwealth Journalists Association (2016-2018) and a consultant with ‘Power Politics’ monthly magazine

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