A SOURCE of contention in arguing about a human right is that the provenance of such an argument is, in fact, always an exclusive argument about the parameters of the human right in question.
Refer, for example, to the scorching human rights debates in recent weeks, namely the act of defaming a particular faith or a particular religion in exercising one's freedom of expression.
The Organisation of the Islamic Cooperation (OIC) is responsible for spearheading efforts to secure international condemnation of acts deemed defamatory of religion, and more specifically, defamatory of Islam.
Although the United Nations General Assembly (UNGA) Resolution entitled "Combating Defamation of Religions" had initially been put forward by the OIC in the UNGA since its 60th Session in 2006, the concept of defamation of religions was rejected on principle by the Occident, including the European Union (EU),Canada and the United States.
At this juncture, it had become evident, there is an asymmetrical discord on two fronts.
Firstly, the interface between freedom of expression and freedom of religion, and secondly, the threshold of both freedoms, between Occidental states on the one hand, and member states of the OIC on the other.
The Occidental objection to the emerging norm, labelled "defamation of religion", is derived from the gradual decoupling and defusing of religion from the state in the Occident. With very few exceptions, (certain Chinese sophists and certain Arab philosophers in the 12 century), no such turning away from religion is to be found in the history of the world outside of the Occident.
The mediaeval Christian knew natural law, where the main emphasis was on man's duties to his sovereign or his fellow man. Individualism in the Occident gave a new turn to the doctrine of natural law by embracing man's rights against his sovereign and his rights against the rights of everyone else.
The offence of blasphemy perceived by the Occident is firstly, anachronistic in a secular society, and secondly, an infringement or denial upon, the right to freedom of speech.
The Universal Declaration of Human Rights (UDHR) does not mandate a single way of life for the entire world. It neither refers to nature or god, but invites each culture and/or religion to share its own account of the philosophical underpinnings of being human.
Nor does the UDHR call for the separation of religion and state. Instead, Article 29(1) of the same declaration, which declares "[e]veryone has duties to the community in which alone the free and full development of his personality is possible", underscores firstly, the idea of human duty which recognises the interest of another, or others, as coming before one's own, hence governing the parameters of human rights of an individual claiming to exercise these rights, and secondly, a community which may be premised on any religious affiliation and/or cultural affinity.
Articles 18 and 19 of the UDHR proclaim freedom of religion and freedom of expression respectively.
At the forefront is the legal debate on whether freedom of expression does not include the right to defame a religion or belief.
On one hand, is the claim that religious beliefs such as Islam must define the parameters of human rights in their own terms, and the other hand claims asymmetrical superiority of secular understanding of the same.
The UDHR does not assume the notion of human rights is secular and that it takes priority over religious values, and vice versa. Instead, the UDHR mirrors the concern that inspires the insistence on one's human duties to the community.
To illustrate, the exercise of the right to freedom of expression of a secularist coincides with the duty of the secularist to respect the freedom of religion and the belief of the Muslim community, including their right to have their religion or belief, to be free from vilification.
The diversity of the world's cultures and/or religions makes mutual duties and harmony among human beings and peoples, imperative. In sum, the exercise of human rights and fundamental freedoms, including freedom of expression, must not, in any irrevocable, circumstances whatsoever, incite grave conflicts between individuals, as well as between peoples, which may in turn lead to hatred, resentment and violence.
Otherwise, a courteous and civil global peace, will forever remain a chimerical objective.
The writer is Senior Lecturer at the Faculty of Law, Universiti of Malaya