THE Asean Ministerial Meeting (AMM) next week will see more discussions on one of its most intractable conundrums — how the regional organisation manages its relationship with Myanmar's military junta, which is murdering its own dissenting population.
Asean needs to recognise the situation for what it is. Only then can it realistically contemplate its options. Policymakers and readers should bear the implications of following indicators in mind.
First, the two Asean chairs, Brunei and Cambodia, and their respective special envoys have not achieved anything substantial thus far. Neither has any Asean member, whether quiet or loud, cajoling or critical. The junta has rebuffed everything, even meeting the five-point consensus halfway.
Cambodia's Prime Minister Hun Sen's solo efforts to broker some middle ground, without the buy-in of Asean members, has also failed, leading to greater fractiousness within the regional organisation on Myanmar.
Second, recent executions of four democracy activists, including a former National League for Democracy lawmaker, signals the resolve of the junta to its domestic and international audience.
The executions have drawn much criticism. But, with thousands dead and hundreds of thousands displaced by genocidal violence by the Tatmadaw, it isn't a surprise.
More than 120 others have been sentenced to death for anti-junta activities since February 2021, an odious sign of things to come.
Third, the Tatmadaw is an insular institution concerned with survival and power. They also have decades of experience surviving sanctions and enforced isolation.
Myanmar today is also not the Myanmar of the 80s and 90s.
Key neighbours and international partners continue to maintain diplomatic, trade and security relations, ensuring the junta isn't completely cut off.
Threats to continue to exclude it from Asean summits and foreign ministers' meetings are mere annoyances. The Tatmadaw still continues to participate in Asean's Defence Ministers' Meeting (ADMM) and ADMM Plus.
Fourth, Myanmar is in civil conflict. It isn't just the staggering numbers directly attributed to post-coup violence — at least 2,000 killed and between 700,000 and one million displaced.
The increasing violent backlash to junta rule and brutality is something it did not expect.
The Tatmadaw might be the largest purveyor of violence, but it is by no means the only one dispensing it.
Civil and private sector officials perceived as collaborators have been targeted for assassination. Military families are restricted to tightly guarded cantonments or relocated to the only truly secure city, Naypyidaw.
The National Unity Government (NUG) has endorsed its People's Defence Forces as a legitimate armed resistance group. They continue to get a steady stream of volunteers.
Violence has spread to almost all parts of the country and simmering conflicts with several ethnic armed groups have kicked off again.
The tragedy is that there is little desire or impetus for the junta and anti-coup forces to reconcile.
As violence intensifies and economic catastrophe, food insecurity and a breakdown of public services spread, the displacement of people inside Myanmar and across its borders is inevitable.
Many fleeing for safety will be at high risk of human trafficking and other forms of exploitation.
Will Asean continue with the status quo — pushing for adherence to the five-point consensus and excluding Myanmar's political and military leadership from key forums? How long can this last, seeing that only a few of its member states have really stood firm on this?
Or, can Asean wait it out till elections scheduled sometime for 2023, where a preferred outcome for the junta is all but assured. It would bolster the case of those calling for the restoration of Myanmar's representation in Asean. But, it would be unequivocally shambolic.
Or, will we see a breakdown of any semblance of unity among Asean members in dealing with Myanmar, some choosing to engage more openly with the NUG while others work with the junta?
While Asean needs to deal with Myanmar as it is, it ought to bear in mind that there are different stakeholders there, all of whom have a legitimate say.
The Tatmadaw, as distasteful as they are, is one of them. But, so are the people of Myanmar and those democratically elected.
Democratic values often struggle to thrive among Southeast Asia's governing elites. But, the regional organisation has committed to be "people-oriented, people-centred and rules-based".
And, if Asean does not bother living up to its own pledges, then it has only itself to blame for the dwindling confidence in its relevance.
The writer is a senior fellow at the Institute of Strategic and International Studies (ISIS) Malaysia