ON June 7, Turkey, migrated to an uncertain political epoque, as the electorate unshackled President Recep Tayyip Erdogan and his Justice and Development Party (AKP) from the reins of power. Such a thirst for régime change echoes a broader reform zeitgeist amidst the tumultuous times of a post-Arab Spring.
The quintessential question now is how Turkey evolves next.
Erdogan may ask the recently-resigned prime minister, Ahmet Davutoglu, to form a government. Erdogan may compromise under a ceremonial presidency, espousing a non-meddling back seat, permitting Davutoglu to knit together a coalition with the opposition.
Abdullah Gul could also be vying for the prime ministerial title via a by-election. However, unlike Davutoglu, Gul is less likely to play second-fiddle to Erdogan.
It is naive to write off Erdogan prematurely. These elections are not a fait accompli. On June 7, the centre right in Turkey garnered 60 per cent of votes, whereas the centre-left held 40 per cent. De facto, the AKP won a fourth election, scooping 40.8 per cent of the vote, teetering Turkey into the throes of constitutional ambiguity.
Second in place were the secular-nationalist Republican People’s Party (CHP) at 24.96 per cent of the vote with 132 seats; third the right-wing Nationalist Movement Party (MHP) at 16.29 per cent with 80 seats; and fourth the leftist People’s Democratic Party (HDP) at 13.12 per cent.
For the first time in Turkey’s history, 18 million Kurds, Armenians and Yazidis received parliamentary representation via the HDP, an emissary for the excluded and buoyed by charismatic co-leader Selahattin Demirtaş, evolving the Kurdish movement from the blood-stained battlefields in the southeast to the corridors of influence in Ankara.
The AKP, with opposition support, may form a minority government with 258 seats, 18 seats shy for single-party rule. Although, CHP, MHP and HDP leaders are lukewarm; partly because a marriage of coalition convenience will dent their image as tactical weakness in the event of re-elections. A junior coalition partner must also justify its sudden U-turn to a discerning electorate.
As for an AKP-CHP coalition, though CHP’s Murat Karayalçin declined, party leader Kemal Kiliçdaroglu, beset by internal leadership crisis, may be sanguine. Rumours about an AKP-CHP tie-up has deepened after Deniz Baykal, Kiliçdaroglu’s predecessor, met Erdogan on June 10.
AKP’s most viable coalition partner is the right-wing MHP. An AKP-MHP alliance would combine a total of 58 per cent of the vote, a tactical right-wing shift reflecting a broader global right-wing resurgence as with India’s BJP party, Germany’s Pegida and France’s National Front.
The AKP may also court HDP for a coalition. Erdogan’s tacit backing of the Islamic State (IS) in a battle for the Kurdish city of Kobani had alienated pro-AKP Kurds towards the HDP. AKP’s chance of grazing single-party rule is to re-entice these Kurds.
This can be secured by extending an olive branch to the HDP. Though Demirtaş won’t cede, PKK founder Abdullah Öcalan, caving into Kissingerian realpolitik while clasping influence over the HDP, may acquiesce. Öcalan is instrumental in defeating part of Syrian IS in reclaiming “Rojava” or Syrian Kurdistan.
This would compel AKP to posit a harder anti-IS stance. Turkey can ill-afford to play gateway for militants travelling from Europe to Syria.
If the AKP cannot find a coalition partner, it may devolve the task of government formation to the CHP, which could form a minority government or tie the knot with MHP, with MHP chairman Devlet Bahçeli yearning to resurrect corruption charges against AKP politicians.
But still, the cumulative seats in a CHP-MHP alliance still lacks a majority. CHP-MHP would need HDP’s acquiescence, though MHP’s nationalist rhetoric renders this unlikely. MHP’s Bahçeli is seeking a cessation of peace talks with HDP’s Öcalan, which will be alienating the Kurds.
No coalition government in Turkey has ever successfully completed a full political term. Any junior coalition partner would extract their proverbial pound of flesh, à la Merchant of Venice.
Coalitions necessitate checks and balances à la Montesqieu, which is not yet fully ingrained in Turkey’s political DNA.
Lack of a coalition implies early elections over the next 40 days, wherein the political pendulum could swing to reassert AKP’s mandate to power.
These elections imply a closer scrutiny of Turkey’s foreign policies on the global geostrategic chessboard, possibly triggering deeper engagement between Turkey, the United States and the West, partially unravelled over the past 13 years.
But, a rapprochement towards a resource-rich Middle East and China is irreversible, especially as Europe is debt-saddled where the Euro has hit the doldrums.
German Chancellor Angela Merkel’s “privileged partnership” offer to Turkey is not enticing for the Turks as it falls way short of full European Union membership.
What unfolds in Turkey next is of monumental consequence for the Middle East. Turkey is a harbinger for moderate Muslim democracy. A defiant Assad in neighbouring Syria, a nuclear assertive Iran and region-wide tumult with a Yemen war underscore the salience of Turkey’s stability.
As a pivotal North Atlantic Treaty Organisation ally and at a geo-political epicentre, Turkey can ill-afford cumbersome political uncertainties now. Turkey, and the wider region’s future hinges on prompt government formation and decisive action.
Twitter: @ozerkhalid
The writer is a senior consultant,
geo-strategist, and freelance journalist