AS Ramadhan welcomed Muslims to its embrace, and peace, prayer, and reflection were eagerly anticipated, Southeast Asia was rudely reminded that even the holy month was not sacred to extremists.
Late last monthin May, our region came under the spotlight as a military siege transpired in Marawi City, in the, southern Philippines, in response to attacks prompted by the Maute group, a splinter cell of the bigger Daesh Islamic State satellite network in Southeast Asia.
It has been the ambition of IS Daesh to set up a secure wilayat in this region since losing grip in its their main strongholds of Iraq and Syria. It seems that with the arrest of three Malaysians who sought to gain safe passage to Marawi from Sandakan and with the reported involvement of 38 Indonesian militants in the Marawi conflict, the appeal of IS Daesh and its propaganda remain appealing.
Despite hundreds of meetings and millions of dollars of investment in countering violent extremism (CVE) initiatives, questions still arise. Why is extremist propaganda still attractive to many? Who do we blame? How can we put this extreme influence to an end?
Greater democratic space in society has opened the doors to more common conversations about identity in the public domain. Often, these interactions gravitate around the sensitive premises of one’s’ ideology, culture, and faith. At times, discussions can turn sour as the call for tolerance is misunderstood as a demand for absolute compromise. AS WELL, The acceptance of different interpretations of history and cultural norms is also no longer highly valued by certain factions of society — flagging an early and potential sign of radicalism. This search for, and in some cases assertion of, the individual identity against the backdrop of a multi-ethnic and multi-faith society has coincided with the recent rise of right- and left-wing extremism globally.
Traditionally, CVE recognisesd two central approaches — the hard approach, which is largely tended to by conventional security agencies, and the social approach, which that is mostly organised by civil society groups and local communities. In Malaysia, these defined efforts generally flow in a rather fluid manner with no higher authority to govern players and initiatives in within a defined programmatic structure of CVE.
On the one hand, this situation could propel CVE efforts into an unanchored direction as these efforts can require considerably large resources, as well as some form of guidance to keep its momentum going, hence, the rationale of centralisation by way of entrusting a higher mandate of agenda-setting to a well-resourced and legally accountable entity.
Yet, this same authorised body could find itself in a dilemma, caught between vested interests that seek to control CVE narratives and allowing freer conversations to take place.
The question of whether CVE narratives would be more effective through a centralised or decentralised approach should be considered, particularly against the now -accepted wisdom that CVE is better off as a whole-of-society effort. Crucially, in order to send and project the right messages, CVE narratives should be sensitive to the evolution of how conversations in society are shaped and influenced over the course of time.
Some of these conversations are more one-way than a genuine exchange. Whether out of cultural courteousness or deference to hierarchical structures, trust is sometimes conferred on others to decide what is best, even on the most mundane of subjects, according these parties a greater influence on how issues are thought through than they may sometimes be deserving of.
In this instance, a centralised approach to narratives may prove limiting in effect and perhaps even backfire on the overall CVE effort, depending on the message conveyed, messenger, and the end goal. Even if this approach is preferred, it is imperative for stakeholders to ensure that checks and balances remain intact and that the culture of dialogue is preserved without prejudice.
The exchange of ideas should flow with minimum and careful restrictions in gauging the reality on the ground. Although sometimes to controversial effect, well-known, private, technology platforms like Facebook, Google, and Twitter have on numerous occasions assisted, facilitated, and provided CVE campaigns with the online space for information to flow. Until now, these channels have allowed members of society to forge frank, sometimes even blunt, interactions, allowing players from various sectors to recognise complexities on the ground and collate real-time raw data for future designs of inclusive counter-narratives.
Cross-partnerships between players are is an inevitable phenomenon. In sustaining effective CVE initiatives and in order to remain agile in the rapidly -changing extremism landscape, players will have to come to terms with differences in ideas and interests. On occasion, they may even have to accept and embrace them as a way to buttress against extremist propaganda.
In moving forward, whether or not the centralisation of CVE narratives is the way to go is up for debate. It should, however, start in a healthier space of interactions, with more tolerance and empathy.
Nurul Izzati
The writer Nurul Izzati is a researcher on foreign policy and security studies (fpss) at the Institute of Strategic and International Studies (ISIS) Malaysia