TOMORROW, Kim Jong-un will become the first North Korean leader to step on to South Korean soil since the Korean War more than six decades ago. In a highly symbolic moment, he will cross the Demilitarised Zone at the Panmunjom border security area to meet his South Korean counterpart, Moon Jae-in.
A remarkable transformation from half a year ago, when the peninsula seemed on the verge of war, with North Korean missile and nuclear tests taking place and heightened rhetoric and name-calling from both the North Korean and United States sides.
The history of relations between the two Koreas is littered with false starts, interrupted dialogues and dashed hopes. Yet, this time, it does seem as if some progress could be made, for two reasons.
Firstly, not just an activist South Korean president but also a North Korean leader suddenly willing to engage, and, secondly, a prior commitment to an unprecedented North Korea-US summit soon after.
President Jae-in has, from the start of his presidency, tried to bring normality into the relationship with the North. But even though his sympathies were broadly in line with his two liberal predecessors, who strongly advocated engagement with the North and participated in summits with Kim Jong-il in 2000 and 2007, Jae-in was also determined that, in close contact with the US, sanctions against the North should remain in place until progress was made.
Jae-in has been rewarded, not just with the unexpected active participation by the North in the Pyeongchang Winter Olympics, but also by Jong-un’s decisions to hold a summit with him as well as, more dramatically, with US President Donald Trump a month later.
Despite his early education in Switzerland and his change of style in leadership within North Korea, Jong-un has remained an enigmatic figure. Even his recent visit to Beijing was shrouded in mystery.
But he will have to be much more open to the world in the two forthcoming summits. So, what are his motivations?
Jong-un’s main priority remains ensuring the survival of North Korea and his family regime by reducing the likelihood of any military attack by the US and its allies.
As shown by his speeches this year, he is confident that his missile and nuclear capabilities have reached a level sufficient to deter any US aggression.
Nonetheless, Jong-un and his advisers, like many other political leaders around the world, cannot be entirely sure what Trump will do in any given situation, so at least talking to the “enemy” may be an additional safeguard. Jong-un also understands that the road to Washington goes through Seoul, so he needs first to talk with Jae-in.
Prestige and legitimacy matter to the North Korean elite. So, Jong-un wants to show how much North Korea and he himself are respected in the international community; the North is no longer the pariah state that no-one wants to talk with. Jong-un has been treated as an “equal” by Chinese leader Xi Jinping already and Jae-in and Trump will now follow.
Crucially, Jong-un believes that he is achieving de facto recognition of his state as a nuclear weapon power. The very fact that the US is willing to negotiate over denuclearisation is taken by him as a sign of US recognition that the North has already reached that nuclear club status.
Even before the summit with Jae-in, Jong-un appears to have given away what could have been one of his negotiating cards: a moratorium or freeze on nuclear and missile tests and a commitment to cease operations at the main nuclear site.
Of course, the freeze has effectively already been in place since the beginning of this year as diplomacy began to take over and no testing does not mean that research and development on the crucial task of miniaturisation of nuclear warheads will not continue.
In fact, Jong-un’s gesture puts Jae-in on the spot. As the host, Jae-in should make some appropriate gestures too once the summit begins. This could be loosening some of the harsher sanctions and providing some “humanitarian” aid to the North.
Moreover, by getting Jae-in to agree on a declaration calling for the formal “end” of the Korean War, Jong-un may be able to achieve a commitment to start negotiations for a “new framework” for security on the peninsula: a peace treaty to replace the existing armistice agreement.
Jong-un has laid down a dual policy of nuclear weapon development and economic reconstruction. With the nuclear programme probably at the stage he would like, he may now feel the need to focus on the restoring the economy.
To avoid ever-increasing dependence on China, Jong-un knows that he needs to improve relations with the South and with the US, not least because through that process signals could be sent to other states to re-engage economically.
But the prospect of genuine reconciliation between the two Koreas depends on the key issue of denuclearisation. Jong-un will probably tell Jae-in that all the precise details surrounding denuclearisation can only be discussed with Trump, but he would hope to get Jae-in to at least agree that a step-by-step process is the way forward.
This would create a gap between Jae-in and Trump, who has been calling for a more immediate and comprehensive “deal”.
Jae-in and his advisers are well aware of such a possibility, but Jae-in also appreciates that an incremental series of “concessions” by all sides is the most practical way forward.
Jae-in has taken a brave step forward by bringing Jong-un out into the summit fold. For Malaysia and other regional states, a reduction of tension on the Korean peninsula is a welcome development, but there are many more steps along the road to real reconciliation and peace.
To paraphrase former British prime minister Winston Churchill, who was himself a great believer that talking was better than fighting, this may not be the beginning of the end, but this week’s summit could well be the end of the beginning of the process of at last bringing peace to the Korean peninsula.
The writer is Adjunct Professor at Lingnan University, Hong Kong (based in Melaka)