SEVERAL security analysts have discovered that organised transnational crime operators in certain countries are using various modes of corruption to facilitate and protect their illegal business transactions.
John T. Picarelli explained in “Transnational Organised Crime” (2008) that “transnational organised crime is a label which applies to sophisticated criminal activities that cross the borders of states”.
“Such criminal activities are frequently estimated to consume between five to 20 per cent of gross domestic product per annum, making the illicit political economy a significant source of global revenue.”
He added, “While forced labour, small arms and illicit drugs are the three largest illicit markets globally, such criminal markets are closely associated with increasing levels of money laundering and the spread of political corruption.”
Phil Williams, on the other hand, wrote in “Strategy for a New World: Combating Terrorism and Transnational Organised Crime” (2007) that “Instrumental or operational corruption is designed to facilitate cross-border trafficking activities”.
“The targets are Customs and Immigration officers charged with the responsibility of protecting the borders. In this sense, corruption payments are simply the cost of doing business.”
He also said: “Perhaps even more serious is what Ethan Nadelmann (1993) termed ‘systemic corruption’ where organised crime seeks to corrupt policymakers, bureaucrats, law enforcement personnel and members of the judiciary in order to maintain a low-risk environment from which they can operate with high level of impunity.”
Conceptually, all of the above have indicated that organised trans-border smuggling and trafficking activities are perceived as synergetic with corruption in some government agencies and are believed to be linked to money laundering and political corruption.
However, are inter-state, inter-regional or inter-continental organised crime — especially pertaining to human trafficking and smuggling of contrabands — operating in Malaysia? What are the causes; do they induce corruption; and how are they being mitigated?
There are many empirical cases which might provide answers to these puzzles in Malaysia.
For example, it was recently reported that the police had uncovered a syndicate, including a senior officer in a sensitive government department, for allegedly selling personal identification documents to non-Malaysians.
In the following week, the police were also reported to have crippled an international drug syndicate allegedly smuggling cocaine worth more than RM2 billion, believed to be from South America.
There was also a report last year which estimated that “for every documented foreign worker (in Malaysia), there are 2.5 undocumented ones. Together, they number six million or one-fifth of Malaysia’s population of 30 million”.
These cases implicitly indicate that organised transnational crime might exist in Malaysia, in which abuse of power and corruption could be perceived as the major driver to its operation.
Cases of organised crime in Malaysia, therefore, should be analysed from the perspective of instrumental, operational or systemic corruption; and from its impact on human security, economic security, identity security and national security.
This is because widespread availability of illicit drugs, for example, is an added threat to Malaysia which has more than 132,000 drug addicts; unauthorised issuance of identification documents to foreigners might one day jeopardise the country’s identity structure; and rampant corruption by certain individuals in our enforcement agencies would definitely threaten the country’s national security.
As such, the Malaysian government should consider conducting comprehensive studies on cases related to organised crime in the country to find out its impact on our enforcement agencies and to the security sectors.
This will enable the government to ascertain the intensity of the problem, understand its exact causes, find out which laws need to be further tightened and strategise on the most effective measures to deal with it in an integrated manner.
The formulation of this holistic approach, however, requires a special task force comprising all Malaysian security stakeholders, including the Malaysian Anti-Corruption Commission, to be placed under the supervision of a permanent secretariat. This task force can help facilitate the sharing of assets, intelligence and expertise among the stakeholders in mitigating organised crime which are syndicated, sophisticated and networked in nature.
Without prejudice, Malaysian enforcement agencies found vulnerable to threats from systemic corruption must also devise effective re-training programmes on anti-graft, sectoral security and national security.
In other words, organised crime in Malaysia should be seriously dealt with through an integrated government approach as well as through attitudinal correction programmes on corruption and security.
It is impertinent to overcome this crime through impulsive decisions taken on a piece-meal basis, influenced by a silo mentality perspective, or motivated by inter-departmental jealousies.
This is crucial if we are serious about wiping out corruption and want to deny organised crime syndicates from making Malaysia its transit hub.
This is particularly so as the authorities have acknowledged that this threat from organised crime syndicates is tantamount to betraying the country.
The writer is a student of strategic and security studies, and was a member of parliament for Parit Sulong, Johor, 1990-2003