ALONG with Syria, Iraq and Libya, Yemen is the fourth state heading towards collapse in the aftermath of the Arab Spring revolts. The world’s newest failed state is fronting dangerous elements of a sectarian feud, the attempted return of an ousted authoritarian and the expansion of anti-Western extremist groups like al-Qaeda and the Islamic State.
In addition, with the recent bombing campaign by Saudi Arabia and its coalition, the fear of Yemen entering a proxy war between the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) states and Iran should not been overrated. If the proxy war route is pursued, the conflict is likely to rage for years in the poorest country of the Arab world.
The Saudi-led “Decisive Storm” airstrikes are an effort to keep Aden from falling into the hands of the Houthi rebels. Besides a coalition consisting of 10 countries, including the GCC, US President Barack Obama has authorised the provision of logistical and intelligence support for this military operation.
Yemen’s struggles during and since the Arab Spring uprising of 2011 have often been overlooked by the Western media. Interest in the country has largely been limited to al-Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula (AQAP). Yet, the most important development in Yemen since 2011 has been the rise and expansion of the Houthi militants.
The Houthis, nearly 30 per cent of Yemen’s population, have little popular support in most parts of the country. Founded as a revivalist movement for the Zaidi form of Shia Islam, the Houthis have transformed themselves over the past decade into a formidable militia. They are effective fighters who seized the capital city, Sanaa last September and brought President Abd-Rabbu Mansour Hadi’s government to its knees. Aden, the country’s economic hub — a coastal city — is the last base after the elected government was forced out of Sanaa. The takeover would mark the collapse of what is left of Hadi’s grip on power.
Working behind the scenes during the Hadi-Houthi standoff was Ali Abdullah Saleh, Yemen’s former president, who was forced to step down in 2012 following months of violent protests that swept the country in the wake of the Arab Spring. Saleh, himself a Zaidi Shia Muslim, fought a series of wars against the Houthis when he was president, but is now squarely on their side or at least determined to use them as he makes his political comeback.
The Houthis have said they intend to establish a representative government and fight systemic corruption. State institutions are frail, and the government has failed to meet some of the most basic needs. Across the capital, residents endure shortages of running water, fuel and electricity. Hadi, a former general, is seen by the Houthis as a pawn of Sunni Gulf Arab monarchies and the West.
The Houthis have since called for a general mobilisation of forces and managed to take control of Taiz, Yemen’s third largest city, as well as much of the province of Lahij, both just to the north of Aden and then swept into the nearby al-Annad base which the US military had left. Controlling ballistic and heavy weaponry, the Houthi militants have the potential to take control of the country’s air force.
The Houthi militants are expanding their presence into western Yemen around a vital maritime corridor that controls access to the Red Sea, a potential threat for some of the eight per cent of global trade that runs through the Suez Canal. The Bab al-Mandab strait separates the Arabian Peninsula from east Africa and links the Red Sea with the Gulf of Aden and the Indian Ocean. Most ships using the waterway have come from, or are going to, Egypt’s Suez Canal which connects the Red Sea with the Mediterranean and which contributes about US$5 billion (RM18 billion) a year to the Egyptian economy. About four per cent of the global oil supply, much of it from Saudi Arabia and the other Gulf states, passes through the strait. The southern port city of Aden controls the entrance to the Red Sea and the Bab al-Mandab strait, through which about 20,000 ships pass annually.
The uneasiness in Riyadh and Cairo over the Bab al-Mandab strait has been growing since the Houthis took control of the western port of Hodeidah on Oct 15 last year. The Iranians, who have made a recent commitment to support the Houthis, could use the port of Hodeidah, which is now under Houthis’ control, to ship arms from Sudan via Djibouti. Teheran had threatened in the past to block the Straits of Hormuz, the region’s other checkpoint, through which a fifth of global oil supply passes on a daily basis.
Yemen is no stranger to outside interference. For the last 20 years, the US military has maintained a small and discreet military presence in the country, mostly training and advising on counterterrorism. The US is primarily concerned with maintaining a regime in Sanaa that is both able and willing to cooperate with ongoing efforts to weaken and ultimately destroy AQAP, which Washington views as being among al-Qaeda’s deadliest “franchisee”. In January, AQAP claimed responsibility for the violent attack on the office of the satirical magazine Charlie Hebdo in Paris.
AQAP appears to be in a position to gain the most from the turmoil in Yemen. AQAP attacked and took brief control of the town of Al-Houta, only 30km from Al-Anad Air Base, where US special operations forces were training Yemeni counterterrorism units to fight them. This was a major factor for the US to pull those forces out of the country.
As the Yemen crisis tops the agenda, the leaders of the 26th Arab League summit have called for a unified Arab force to confront the Houthi rebels. As the stage is set for a confrontation between regional powers, Houthis, AQAP and possibly Iran, the country with half of the population already trapped in poverty, is entering a dangerous new phase that may lead to
another round of civil, sectarian and proxy wars.
The writer is a former lecturer of UiTM, Shah Alam and International Islamic University Malaysia, Gombak